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Reconciling the Ministerial Exception and Title VII: 
Clarifying the Employer’s Burden for the Ministerial 
Exception 
Amy Dygert* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The ministerial exception, under the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses of the First Amendment, provides an immunity for churches or 
religious organizations from employment discrimination claims. Under the 
exception, qualifying religious organizations are protected from 
employment discrimination claims brought by employees who hold or 
held a position within the organization that included a religious function.1 
As the ministerial exception lies between civil rights and First Amendment 
rights, it is imperative that the Supreme Court provide clear guidance for 
lower courts.  
The ministerial exception is undeniably a powerful tool for religious 
organizations. However, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n,2 the Supreme Court’s first 
opinion on the exception,3 the Court specifically avoided any indications 
of the exception’s scope, leaving unclear what organizations qualify for 
the protection. In the absence of such guidance, the application of the 
exception falls prone to bias, and is perhaps more readily available for 
some religious groups than for others.4  
 
* J.D. Washington University in St. Louis School of Law (2018).  
1. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 188 
(2012). 
2. 565 U.S. 171 (2012).  
3. Id. at 188.  
4. The Supreme Court has been cautious to define religion. It has approached the issue in cases of 
the Universal Military Training and Service Act, concerning the conscientious objector exception: in 
United States v. Seeger, the Court held that “the test of belief ‘in a Supreme Being’ is whether a given 
belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled 
by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.” 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 
(1965). Considering an exception to a state’s compulsory education law, the Supreme Court in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder distinguished religion from secular values:  
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to 
reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have 
the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief…the very 
concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on 
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This Note proposes clarifying the ministerial exception, namely the 
burden employers must meet in order to be protected. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor, the first case in which the Supreme 
Court affirmed the existence of the exception, fell far short of this mark. I 
argue that there should be a three-prong test for employers in order to 
apply the ministerial exception to a particular employment issue. Two of 
these prongs are already being utilized by lower courts and are present in 
the Hosanna-Tabor ruling, though not specifically identified as part of a 
threshold test: (1) that the employer be a religious institution; (2) that the 
position in question be a minister. The third prong, which has not been 
required, is a notice requirement: I argue this prong is necessary in order to 
preserve the integrity of federal employment discrimination laws.  
Part II of this Note examines the history of the ministerial exception 
leading up to the 2012 Supreme Court decision in Hosanna-Tabor, the 
application of the Hosanna-Tabor ruling in circuit courts, its correlation 
with Title VII, and an overview of the religious demographics of the 
United States today. Part III of this note critically examines the conflict 
between Title VII protection to individual employees and the First 
Amendment rights of individuals and religious institutions. Part IV of this 
note includes a proposal of both modified language and a clarified test for 
the application of the ministerial exception.  
 
I. HISTORY 
 
A. Religion in US Law and Policy 
 
In 2012, the Supreme Court addressed the ministerial exception for the 
first time in Hosanna-Tabor.5 In his majority opinion, Justice Roberts 
includes a foundation: the history of “[c]ontroversy between church and 
 
matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.  
406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). The Court held that the “traditional way of life of the Amish is not 
merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized 
group, and intimately related to daily living.” Id. at 216. See generally Stanley Ingber, Religion or 
Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233 (1989); Jesse Choper, 
Defining ‘Religion’ in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579 (1982). 
5. 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
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state.”6 This controversy, in fact, predates the United States and its 
Constitution: “In 1215, the issue was addressed in the very first clause of 
Magna Carta. There, King John agreed that ‘the English church shall be 
free, and shall have its rights undiminished and its liberties unimpaired.’”7 
Centuries later, the Puritans left England “[s]eeking to escape the control 
of the national church,” hoping “to elect their own ministers and establish 
their own modes of worship.”8 As the United States came into being, the 
First Amendment was adopted “to foreclose the possibility of a national 
church,” ensuring that the federal government “would have no role in 
filling ecclesiastical offices.”9 In this spirit, the First Amendment includes 
two clauses commonly referred to as the Religion Clauses: the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.10 
The Establishment Clause prohibits discrimination of religion by 
Congress.11 Initially, the establishment clause prevents the passage of laws 
that facially discriminate against any religion.12 If a law is challenged, the 
 
6. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182.  
7. Id. 
8. Id.  
9. Id. at 183-84. 
10 . “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
11. The establishment clause prohibits any law “respecting an establishment of religion.” See id. 
12. Allegheny Cty. v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1989).   
In the course of adjudicating specific cases, this Court has come to understand the 
Establishment Clause to mean that government may not promote or affiliate itself with any 
religious doctrine or organization, may not discriminate among persons on the basis of their 
religious beliefs and practices, may not delegate a governmental power to a religious 
institution, and may not involve itself too deeply in such an institution's affairs. 
Id.  
The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a 
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence 
a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief 
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious 
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or 
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be 
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious 
organizations or groups and vice versa. 
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1942).  
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Courts apply the “Lemon test,” developed by the Supreme Court in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman.13 In Lemon, the Court distilled precedent on the 
Establishment Clause to the following three-part test: “First, the statute 
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary 
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the 
statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.”14 Courts have used the Lemon test to overrule both state and 
federal laws that violate one or more of these three prongs.15 
Working alongside the Establishment Clause’s prohibition on 
discrimination of religion, the Free Exercise Clause functions to protect 
the practice of religion. An early construction of the Free Exercise Clause 
can be found in Reynolds v. United States,16 where the Supreme Court 
considered whether a Mormon who practiced polygamy could be required 
 
13. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
In Lemon v. Kurtzman . . . the Court sought to refine these principles by focusing on three 
‘tests’ for determining whether a government practice violates the Establishment Clause. 
Under the Lemon analysis, a statute or practice which touches upon religion, if it is to be 
permissible under the Establishment Clause, must have a secular purpose; it must neither 
advance nor inhibit religion in its principal or primary effect; and it must not foster an 
excessive entanglement with religion. This trilogy of tests has been applied regularly in the 
Court's later Establishment Clause cases.  
Allegheny Cty., 492 U.S. at 592 (internal citation omitted).   
14. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13(citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).  
15. Allegheny Cty., 492 U.S. at 592.  
Our subsequent decisions further have refined the definition of governmental action that 
unconstitutionally advances religion. In recent years, we have paid particularly close attention 
to whether the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of 
‘endorsing’ religion, a concern that has long had a place in our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. 
Id.; see generally Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962). Thus, in Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court 
held unconstitutional Alabama’s moment-of-silence statute because it was “enacted . . . for the sole 
purpose of expressing the State’s endorsement of prayer activities.” 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985). The Court 
similarly invalidated Louisiana’s ‘Creationism Act because it ‘endorses religion’ in its 
purpose. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593(1987). And the educational program at issue 
in School District. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, was held to violate the Establishment Clause because of its 
‘endorsement’ effect. 473 U.S. 373, 389-92, (1985). See also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 
1, 17 (1989) (plurality opinion) (tax exemption limited to religious periodicals “effectively endorses 
religious belief”); Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989).  
16. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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to abide by state law that made polygamy unlawful.17 More generally, the 
Court considered “whether religious belief can be accepted as justification 
of an overt act made criminal by the law of the land.”18 Turning to the Free 
Exercise Clause, the Court determined that “Congress cannot pass a law 
for the government of the Territories which shall prohibit the free exercise 
of religion.”19 Looking to the intention of the writers of the Constitution, 
the Court further held that, under the Free Exercise Clause, “Congress was 
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to 
reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of 
good order.”20  
A more recent application of the free exercise clause is Employment 
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.21 There, the Supreme 
Court denied the plaintiffs’ claim of a violation of free exercise. Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, stated, “[w]e have never held that an 
 
17. Id.  
[T]he accused, proved that at the time of his alleged second marriage he was, and for many 
years before had been, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
commonly called the Mormon Church, and a believer in its doctrines; that it was an accepted 
doctrine of that church ‘that it was the duty of male members of said church, circumstances 
permitting, to practise polygamy . . . [the accused] asked the court to instruct the jury that if 
they found from the evidence that he ‘was married as charged—if he was married—in 
pursuance of and in conformity with what he believed at the time to be a religious duty, that 
the verdict must be ‘not guilty.’ This request was refused.  
Id. at 161-62.  
18. Id. at 162.  
19 . Id.  
20. Id. at 164. Decades later, the Supreme Court reiterated this sentiment, describing the free 
expression clause as “embrac[ing] two concepts—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is 
absolute, but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 300, 
303 (1940). 
21. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
This case requires us to decide whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its 
general criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and thus permits the State to deny 
unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously 
inspired use.  
Id. at 874. In this case, two individuals had been “fired from their jobs with a private drug 
rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the 
Native American Church”; these individuals were subsequently denied unemployment compensation, 
having been found to be “ineligible for benefits because they had been discharged for work-related 
‘misconduct.’” Id. 
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individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an 
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”22 
Echoing the construction of the Free Exercise Clause in Reynolds v. 
United States, the Court continued to hold that laws may prohibit certain 
actions regardless of any religious association such actions may carry.  
 
B. Title VII: Protecting Employees in the Workplace 
 
As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et 
seq., protects employees from discrimination on the basis of “race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”23 Beyond Title VII, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), and the Genetic information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 
among others, provide workplace protections for select groups. The ADA 
prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment.”24 Under the ADEA, it is 
unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . because of 
such individual’s age; to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such an individual’s age; or to reduce the wage rate of any 
employee in order to comply with [the ADEA].”25 
Each of these provisions—Title VII,26 the ADA,27 and the ADEA28—
 
22. Id. at 879.  
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973) (developing the burden-shifting framework of an employment discrimination claim); F. 
GREGORY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND THE BATTLE TO END WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION: A 50 
YEAR HISTORY, 2014; HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, JOSEPH L. RAUH, AND JOHN G. STEWART, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION, 1997.  
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). See also The ADA: Your Employment Rights as an Individual with 
a Disability, THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Jan 1, 2017), 
https://www.ee 
oc.gov/facts/ada18.html.  
25. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012). See also Facts About Age Discrimination, THE U.S. EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/age.html.  
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/18
DYGERT NOTE  6/24/19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019]  Reconciling the Ministerial Exception 373 
 
 
includes an anti-retaliation provision. 
 
C. The Religion Clauses and Employment 
 
Nearly eighty years after the ratification of the First Amendment, the 
Supreme Court ruled on a property case arising from an internal 
discrepancy in a church.29 The decision marked the Court’s first 
intervention into an internal church matter. Importantly, the Court did not 
embrace this opportunity to intervene, acknowledging that, if at all 
possible, such matters should be resolved internally by the church.30  
 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his 
employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice 
by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (a) (2012) (“No person shall discriminate against any individual because 
such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such 
individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter”); 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (b) (2012):  
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the 
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on 
account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or 
enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.  
Id.  
28. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). 
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or 
applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against any individual, 
or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for 
membership, because such individual, member or applicant for membership has opposed any 
practice made unlawful by this section, or because such individual, member or applicant for 
membership has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter. 
Id. 
29. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872). 
30. Id. at 734-35. 
The novelty of the questions presented to this court for the first time, their intrinsic 
importance and far reaching influence, and the knowledge that the schism in which the case 
originated has divided the Presbyterian churches throughout Kentucky and Missouri, have 
seemed to us to justify the careful and laborious examination and discussion which we have 
made of the principles which should govern the case. For the same reasons we have held it 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Over the next century, Court intervention began to develop into the 
current ministerial exception. For example, in a Fifth Circuit case, 
McClure v. The Salvation Army,31 plaintiff McClure, an ordained minister 
for the Salvation Army,32 brought suit against the church when her officer 
status was terminated, “alleging that it had engaged in discriminatory 
employment practices against her in violation of Title VII.”33  
On appeal, plaintiff and the EEOC argued that the defendant was “not 
exempt from the prohibitions of Title VII and [was] therefore liable” for 
discrimination.34 In response, the Salvation Army put forth three 
arguments: first, that it did not qualify as an employer under Title VII; 
second, that if it did qualify as an employer, it was an employer within 
Title VII’s § 702 exemption; and third, that if § 702 was not applicable, 
that in this case the application of Title VII would be a violation of the 
First Amendment.35 The Fifth Circuit did not support the defendant’s first 
two arguments—finding it to be an employer within the meaning of Title 
VII36 and to be outside the § 702 exemption.37 However, the court 
 
under advisement for a year, not uninfluenced by the hope, that since the civil commotion . . . 
has passed away, that charity, which is so large an element in the faith of both parties, and 
which, by one of the apostles of that religion, is said to be the greatest of all the Christian 
virtues, would have brought about a reconciliation. But we have been disappointed. It is not 
for us to determine or apportion the moral responsibility which attaches to the parties for this 
result. We can only pronounce the judgment of the law as applicable to the case presented to 
us. 
Id.  
31. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
32. Id. at 554.  
33. Id. at 555. According to the Fifth Circuit, the District Court “found that The Salvation Army 
was a religion and concluded that [plaintiff’s] activities ‘were connected with carrying on of the 
religious activities of The Salvation Army in accordance with § 702 of Title VII.’” Id.  
34. Id. at 556.  
35. See id. 
36. “[T]he record shows that [Plaintiff] was selected, employed, controlled, trained, and paid by 
The Salvation Army. When the existence of such factors is shown, the individual falls within the 
definition of ‘employee.’” Id. at 557. 
37. Id. at 558. 
The language and the legislative history of § 702 compel the conclusion that Congress did not 
intend that a religious organization be exempted from liability for discriminating against its 
employees on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin with respect to their 
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment. 
Id.  
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supported the Salvation’s Army’s third argument, finding that applying 
Title VII would unconstitutionally interfere with internal matters of the 
church.38  
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit held that applying Title VII in this matter 
would entail State “intru[sion] upon matters of church administration and 
government which have so many times before been proclaimed to be 
matters of a singular ecclesiastical concern.”39  
Following McClure, the term “ministerial exception” began being used 
in other circuit courts. For example, in Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of 
Seventh-Day Adventists,40 the Fourth Circuit considered “whether a 
woman denied a pastoral position in the Seventh-day Adventist Church 
 
38. Id. at 560-61. 
We find that the application of the provisions of Title VII to the employment 
relationship existing between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a church 
and its minister would result in an encroachment by the State into an area of 
religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free 
exercise clause of the First Amendment . . . We therefore hold that Congress did 
not intend, through the nonspecific working of the applicable provisions of Title 
VII, to regulate the employment relationship between church and minister. 
Id. “[R]estrictions on the free exercise of religion are allowed only when it is necessary ‘to prevent 
grant and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect.’” Id. at 559 (citing W. 
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). 
39. Id. at 559. The court acknowledged that “[t]he relationship between an organized church and its 
ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its 
purpose.” Id. at 558-59. The court looked to Supreme Court precedent to establish that such internal 
matters of a church are not for courts to decide. Here, it began with Watson v. Jones, where “the 
Supreme Court began to place matters of church government and administration beyond the purview 
of civil authorities.” Id. at 559 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872). Next, the Fifth Circuit 
looked to Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, where the Supreme Court held that, “[i]n the 
absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters 
purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts 
as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.” Id. (citing 
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929)). Third, the court looked to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, where it held that “legislation that 
regulates church administration, the operation of churches [or] the appointment of clergy prohibits the 
free exercise of religion.” Id. (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 107 (1952)). 
Finally, the court looked to a 1969 Supreme Court case in which it posited that “‘[i]f civil courts 
undertake to resolve [controversies over religious doctrine and practice] in order to adjudicate a 
property dispute, the hazards are ever present of . . . implicating secular interests in matters of purely 
ecclesiastical concern.’” Id. at 560 (citing U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)). The Fifth Circuit concluded that the “common thread” through 
these cases was that religious organizations should be free to manage matters of its faith without 
secular interference. Id. (citing Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116). 
40. 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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may charge that church with sexual and racial discrimination under Title 
VII.”41 The case came to the Fourth Circuit after the district court “granted 
summary judgment to defendants on the grounds that the suit was barred 
by the religion clauses of the First Amendment.”42 The court followed an 
analysis similar to that in McClure, finding the case to be within Title VII 
but outside of its § 702 exception for religious employers, and therefore 
placing Title VII at odds with the First Amendment.43  
As Justice Roberts notes in the majority opinion of Hosanna-Tabor, the 
circuit courts had uniformly recognized the ministerial exception prior to 
the Supreme Court granting certiorari.44 
 
D. Overview of Hosanna-Tabor Decision 
 
It was not until 2012 that the Supreme Court encountered the 
exception.45 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court endorsed the 
ministerial exception, and held that an employer, a Lutheran school, could 
 
41. Id. at 1164-65.  
42. Id. at 1165.  
43. “To subject church employment decisions of the nature we consider today to Title VII scrutiny 
would . . . give rise to ‘excessive government entanglement with religious institutions prohibited by 
the establishment clause of the First Amendment.” Id. at 1169-70 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 613 (1971)). 
44. 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012). 
Until today, we have not had occasion to consider whether this freedom of a religious 
organization to select its ministers is implicated by a suit alleging discrimination in 
employment. The Courts of Appeals, in contrast, have had extensive experience with this 
issue. Since the passage of [Title VII] and other employment discrimination laws, the Courts 
of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of a “ministerial exception,” grounded in 
the First Amendment, that precludes application of such legislation to claims concerning the 
employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers. 
Id. (citing Natal v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989); see 
Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204–09 (2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 
303–07 (3d Cir. 2006); E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 800–01 (4th Cir. 
2000); Combs v. Central Tex. Annual Conference, 173 F.3d 343, 345–50 (5th Cir. 1999); Hollins v. 
Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225–227 (6th Cir. 2007); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 
F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 
362–63 (8th Cir. 1991); Werft v. Desert Southwest Annual Conference, 377 F.3d 1099, 1100–04 (9th 
Cir. 2004); Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 655–57 (10th Cir. 2002); Gellington v. Christian 
Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1301–04 (11th Cir. 2000); E.E.O.C. v. Catholic 
Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 460–63 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
45. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. 
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dismiss a teacher whose actions, the school found, did not comply with the 
church’s teachings.46  
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School included “a 
small school in Redford, Michigan, offering a ‘Christ-centered education’ 
to students in kindergarten through eighth grade.”47 As a member of the 
Missouri Synod, the school classified teachers into called and lay 
categories, where lay teachers did not have a religious affiliation or role 
but called teachers were “regarded as being been called to their vocation 
by God through a congregation.”48  
Hosanna-Tabor initially employed plaintiff Cheryl Perich in 1999 as a 
lay teacher.49 Once she completed various qualification requirements, 
“Hosanna-Tabor asked [Perich] to become a called teacher.”50 Perich 
accepted.51 As a called teacher, Perich taught, in different years, 
kindergarten and fourth grade.52 Additionally, Perich “taught a religion 
class four days a week, led the students in prayer and devotional exercises 
each day, and attended a weekly school wide chapel service,” which she 
led “about twice a year.”53  
In 2004, Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy, and she “began the 
2004-2005 school year on disability leave.”54 When Perich tried to return 
to work in January of 2005, the school principal informed her that a lay 
teacher had been appointed “to fill Perich’s position for the remainder of 
 
46. Id. at 190 (“Having concluded that there is a ministerial exception grounded in the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, we consider whether the exception applies in this case. We hold that 
it does”). 
47. Id. at 177 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch., 582 F. 
Supp. 2d 881, 884 (E.D. Mich. 2008)). 
48. Id. Called teachers were required to meet additional qualifications for their positions, including 
“eight courses of theological study, obtain[ing] the endorsement of their local Synod district, and 
pass[ing] an oral examination.” Id. Once qualified, a called teacher is hired when he or she is called by 
a congregation. Id. Upon being called by a congregation, “a teacher receives the formal title ‘Minister 
of Religion, Commissioned.’” Id. “A commissioned minister serves for an open-ended term; at 
Hosanna-Tabor, a call could be rescinded only for cause and by a supermajority vote of the 
congregation.” Id.  
49. Id. at 178. 
50. Id. 
51. Id.  
52. Id.  
53. Id.  
54. Id.  
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the year.”55 Perich again returned to the school on February 22 with 
medical clearance to work; she refused to leave “until she obtained written 
documentation that she had reported to work.”56 The school principal 
informed her “that she would likely be fired,” to which Perich “responded 
that she had spoken with an attorney and intended to assert her legal 
rights.”57 Following her threat of legal action, the school board sent Perich 
a letter informing her that the congregation “would consider whether to 
rescind her call at its next meeting”; the congregation did so, sending a 
letter of termination the day after its decision.58 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court declined to create a test or rule about 
the ministerial exception’s applicability. Finding that “Perich was a 
minister within the meaning of the exception,” the Court found that it was 
“require[d]” to dismiss Perich’s “employment discrimination suit against 
her religion employer.”59 Importantly, the Court used the ministerial 
exception not as persuasive in its analysis of a retaliation claim, but as 
precluding consideration of Perich’s claim altogether.60 Its analysis 
 
55. Id.  
On January 30, Hosanna–Tabor held a meeting of its congregation at which school 
administrators stated that Perich was unlikely to be physically capable of returning to work 
that school year or the next. The congregation voted to offer Perich a ‘peaceful release’ from 
her call, whereby the congregation would pay a portion of her health insurance premiums in 
exchange for her resignation as a called teacher. Perich refused to resign and produced a note 
from her doctor stating that she would be able to return to work on February 22. The school 
board urged Perich to reconsider, informing her that the school no longer had a position for 
her, but Perich stood by her decision not to resign. 
Id. at 179 (citation omitted). 
56. Id. at 179-80.  
57. Id.  
58. Id.  
59. Id. at 194. The Court determined that ordering the school to reinstate Perich would “plainly 
violat[e] the Church’s freedom under the Religion Clauses to select its own ministers.” Id.  
60. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court was careful to distinguish the case at hand from Smith. 
Id. at 190. The Court explained that Smith concerned a state law banning the use of peyote, despite its 
role in certain religious practices; despite the limitation on religious practice the state law imposed, the 
Court found that the law “did not violate the Free Exercise Clause . . . because the ‘right of free 
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of 
general applicability.’” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 879). Finding the 
selection of ministers to be unique from the participation of a religious practice involving peyote, the 
Court held that “Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical acts. The present 
case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church decision that affects the 
faith and mission of the church itself.” Id.  
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focuses more on the protection of a church selecting its own ministers than 
on an individual’s rights under the ADA or Title VII.61 Concerning the 
scope of the ministerial exception, the Court also considered the use of the 
exception in lower federal court, noting that “[e]very Court of Appeals to 
have considered the question has concluded that the ministerial exception 
is not limited to the head of a religious congregation, and [the Supreme 
Court] agree[s].”62 However, while the Court was willing to rule that, in 
this particular case, the ministerial exception applied, precluding the 
plaintiff’s claim, it specifically stopped short of developing a rule or test as 
to the application of the exception.63 The Court’s analysis shows that 
application of the ministerial exception is a fact-based inquiry that 
examines the circumstances of the employment, but provides little 
direction beyond that. 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kagan, concurred in the opinion. While 
Alito supported application of the ministerial exception in this case, he 
sought to clarify the term “minister” in the context of the ministerial 
exception.64 Alito noted that the term was more common in Protestant 
denominations than in other religious practices, “it would be a mistake if 
the term [‘]minister[’] or the concept of ordination were viewed as central 
to the important issue of religious autonomy.”65 Justice Thomas separately 
concurred, arguing that civil courts, when applying the ministerial 
exception, “defer to a religious organization’s good faith understanding of 
 
61. Id. at 188-89. 
The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. Requiring a 
church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, 
intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal 
governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will 
personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise 
Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its 
appointments. According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to 
the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement 
in such ecclesiastical decisions. 
Id.  
62. Id. at 190.  
63. “We are reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies 
as a minister. It is enough for us to conclude, in our first case involving the ministerial exception, that 
the exception covers [Plaintiff], given all the circumstances of her employment.” Id.  
64. Id. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring). 
65. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
DYGERT NOTE  6/24/19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
380 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 58:367 
 
 
who qualifies as its minister.”66  
 
 
E. Critiques and Applications of Hosanna-Tabor 
 
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling on Hosanna-Tabor in 2012, there 
have been several circuit court opinions relying on and interpreting the 
opinion.67 In 2012, the Fifth Circuit considered the termination of a music 
director who claimed his termination violated the ADEA and ADA.68 The 
employer, Catholic Diocese of Austin, claimed that the music director 
position was a minister position, therefore falling within the ministerial 
exception, and based its argument “on the important role music plans in 
the celebration of Mass.” Conversely, the plaintiff argued that, in the 
position of music director, he “merely played the piano at Mass and that 
his only responsibilities were keeping the books, running the sound 
system, and doing custodial work,” activities which are non-ministerial.69  
Looking to Hosanna-Tabor for guidance, the Fifth Circuit observed 
“[t]he Supreme Court specifically declined to adopt a ‘rigid formula’ for 
determining when an employee is a minister within the meaning of the 
ministerial exception, concluding instead ‘that the exception covers 
Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.’”70 The Fifth 
Circuit then turned to its own three-part test, previously established, 
finding that Hosanna-Tabor had not overruled it.71 Ultimately, the Fifth 
 
66. Id. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
67. See generally Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 750 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2014); Cannata 
v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012); Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian 
Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2015); Puri v. Khalsa, No. 13-36024, 2017 WL 65393 (9th Cir. 
2017); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Askew v. Trs. of Gen. Assembly 
of Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith Inc., 684 F.3d 413 (3d Cir. 2012).  
68. Cannata, 700 F.3d at 170-71.  
69. Id. at 177.  
70. Id. at 174 (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190).  
71. Id. at 176.  
The court described its previously established ministerial exception test as follows: First this 
court must consider whether employment decisions regarding the position at issue are made 
largely on religious criteria[.] . . . Second, to constitute a minister for purposes of the 
‘ministerial exception,’ the court must consider whether the plaintiff was qualified and 
authorized to perform the ceremonies of the Church. . .. Third, and probably most important, 
is whether [the employee] engaged in activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical or 
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Circuit ruled that the ministerial exception precluded the plaintiff’s claims, 
finding that “the church has the right to determine who will participate in 
its religious ceremonies.”72 The court agreed with the defendant that the 
plaintiff “played a role in furthering the mission of the church and 
conveying its message to congregants,” therefore allowing the ministerial 
exception to apply to the music director position.73  
The Ninth Circuit also considered the application of the ministerial 
exception in a post-Hosanna-Tabor case, Headley v. Church of 
Scientology Int’l.74 Here, plaintiffs were former ministers of the Church of 
Scientology International (the Church), working at Sea Organization, a 
component of the Church.75 In 2009, plaintiffs brought suit against the 
Church under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.76  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that it did not need to consider the 
ministerial exception in this case, finding instead that “the text of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act resolves this case.”77 The court found 
that the plaintiffs failed to present a valid claim under the Act, and 
therefore it did not need to consider whether the ministerial exception 
applied.78 Still, the Ninth Circuit clearly endorsed the ministerial 
exception.79  
 
religious, including whether the plaintiff attends to the religious needs of the faithful. Id. at 
175-76. (citing Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1999)).  
72. Id. at 180.  
73. Id. 
74. 687 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2012). 
75. Id. at 1174. Plaintiffs joined Sea Organization, a secluded compound, knowing “that they would 
work long, hard hours without material compensation.” Id. at 1175. They worked “more than 100 
hours a week” in exchange for living expenses and “a $50 weekly stipend.” Id. at 1176. However, the 
court found that “[t]hroughout their ministerial service they repeatedly showed by word and deed that 
they enjoyed their work, performed it willingly, and were helping to further the Sea Org[anization]’s 
mission.” Id. at 1175. Gradually, plaintiffs became dissatisfied with their life and work at Sea 
Organization, and each left the ministry in 2005. Id. at 1177. 
76. Id. at 1178. The court notes that plaintiffs “also brought federal and state minimum wage 
claims, but they have abandoned those claims.” Id.  
77. Id. at 1179. The district court had granted summary judgment in favor of the church, holding 
that the plaintiffs’ claims were “barred by the ministerial exception.” Id.  
78. Id.  
79. Id. at 1181. 
The district court rested its rulings on the ministerial exception. The district court was right to 
recognize that courts may not scrutinize many aspects of the minister-church relationship . . . 
Here, moreover, the defendants maintain that the vast majority of the conduct on which the 
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The following year, the Tenth Circuit considered the ministerial 
exception and Hosanna-Tabor in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius.80 
There, the court contemplated an expansion of protected rights to 
organizations that do not fit the definition of religions organizations, 
allowing for other opportunities in which an employer’s religious views 
may limit the rights of employees.81 In sum, after the Supreme Court 
endorsed the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor, circuit courts have 
begun to consider in an increasingly wide array of circumstances that may 
empower and extend the ministerial exception.  
In both practice and academia, Hosanna-Tabor was met with mixed 
reviews. In an article advising employers with a religious focus on how to 
adjust to the decision, Michael Ewing urged employers to clarify which 
employees they consider to be ministers and to be able to justify or explain 
their reasoning.82 Further, Ewing encouraged employers to be clear with 
employees about any religious mission it held, as well as to inform 
employees of any and all expectations related to that mission.83  
In his article, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception,84 Douglas 
Laycock commented on the distinction between Smith85 and Hosanna-
Tabor, tying the distinction to precedent. Laycock argues that the 
distinction “is about ‘outward physical acts’ versus ‘internal’ church 
decisions…The essential point is that internal church governance is 
 
Headleys’ claims rest—stringent lifestyle constraints, assignment to manual labor, strict 
discipline, the requirement to leave the ministry only by routing out, efforts to retain 
ministers, and the practice of declaring some departed members ‘suppressive persons’—is 
religiously motivated or otherwise protected. 
Id.  
80. 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).  
81. Id. at 1136. 
The main point of the Court was that the Religion Clauses add to the mix when considering 
freedom of association . . . But it does not follow that because religious organizations obtain 
protections through the Religion Clauses, all entities not included in the definition of religions 
organization are accorded no rights. 
Id.  
82. Michael Ewing, The ‘Ministerial Exception’: Where Employment Law & Religious Autonomy 
Collide, FROST BROWN TODD (July 2012). 
83. Id. 
84. Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 
839, (Summer 2012).  
85. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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constitutionally protected and is outside the domain of Smith.”86  Relating 
this distinction to the Court’s precedent, Laycock looks to Reynolds v. 
United States87 as a precursor to Smith: “Reynolds upheld a bigamy 
prosecution against a religiously motivated polygamist, holding that the 
Free Exercise Clause required no exception for religious practice.”88 Held 
shortly after Watson, the Court did not directly link the two. However, 
Laycock argues that the two cases can be used to demonstrate the 
distinction Roberts posited in Hosanna-Tabor: that the law does not 
transcend the boundary of the internal church function.89  
Critical of Hosanna-Tabor, Leslie Griffin argues in her article The Sins 
of Hosanna-Tabor, that the majority opinion demonstrates a poor 
interpretation of the First Amendment.90 Griffin urges courts to look to the 
exception as having a role within the employment discrimination 
framework—a religious difference with an employee holding a ministerial 
position being a legitimate reason for a religious employer to terminate the 
employee, while the employee may rebut the employer’s decision by a 
showing of pretext.91  
Critical of Hosanna-Tabor for a different reason, Brian M. Murray 
argues in The Elephant in Hosanna-Tabor92 that the Court’s decision in 
Hosanna-Tabor left a key gap in its analysis, one which will inevitably 
lead to future litigation.93 The gap Murray points to is defining the 
qualification of “religious institution.” Without explaining or in any way 
limiting “which entities may invoke the ministerial exception,” the Court 
allows the ministerial exception to hold the potential of overpowering the 
First Amendment religion clauses themselves.94 In Hosanna-Tabor, the 
Court accepted without question that the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School qualified as a religious institution, therefore 
 
86. Laycock, supra note 84, at 855-56. 
87. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).  
88. Laycock, supra note 84, at 856. 
89. Laycock, supra note 84, at 857. 
90. Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981 (2013). 
91. Griffin, supra note 90, at 1002. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 791, 804 
(1973) (“On remand, respondent must, as the Court of Appeals recognized, be afforded a fair 
opportunity to show that petitioner’s stated reason for respondent’s rejection was in fact pretext.”). 
92. Brian M. Murray, The Elephant in Hosanna-Tabor, 10 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 493 (2012). 
93. Id. at 494.   
94. Id.   
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having access to the ministerial exception.95 In evading the difficult tasks 
of defining “religion” and “minister,” the Court neglected to define or 
even acknowledge this analytical step that would be a threshold to an 
employer invoking a ministerial exception.96 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the 
ministerial exception that had been developed in the lower courts. Justice 
Roberts, writing for the majority, aligned the holding with the existing 
case law: “Since the passage of [Title VII] and other employment 
discrimination laws, the courts of appeals have uniformly recognized the 
existence of a ‘ministerial exception,’ grounded in the First 
Amendment…We agree that there is such a ministerial exception.”97 
Roberts acknowledges that the ministerial exception is in conflict with 
Title VII and similar protections for employees, as he describes the 
exception as a function “that precludes application of such legislation to 
claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious 
institution and its ministers.”98  
Importantly, the Court’s endorsement of the ministerial exception was 
unanimous. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kagan, concurred, seeking to 
clarify the term minister to ensure that it is equally available across 
religions.99 Justice Thomas separately concurred, arguing that, when 
 
95. Id. at 496. 
96. Id. 
97. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012). 
98. Id.  
99. Id. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring). 
I join the Court’s opinion, but I write separately to clarify my understanding of the 
significance of formal ordination and designation as a “minister” in determining whether an 
“employee” of a religious group falls within the so-called “ministerial” exception. The term 
“minister” is commonly used by many Protestant denominations to refer to members of their 
clergy, but the term is rarely if ever used in this way by Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, or 
Buddhists. In addition, the concept of ordination as understood by most Christian churches 
and by Judaism has no clear counterpart in some Christian denominations and some other 
religions. Because virtually every religion in the world is represented in the population of the 
United States, it would be a mistake if the term “minister” or the concept of ordination were 
viewed as central to the important issue of religious autonomy that is presented in cases like 
this one. Instead, courts should focus on the function performed by persons who work for 
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applying the ministerial exception, courts should “defer to a religious 
organization's good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its 
minister.”100 Therefore, while there is some variation within the Court 
regarding the understanding and identification of a “minister,” the 
ministerial exception received unequivocal support.  
When applying Hosanna-Tabor, lower courts have suggested that the 
holding contains certain gaps. In a 2012 case, the Fifth Circuit, while 
acknowledging the Supreme Court’s holding in Hosanna-Tabor, still 
looked to its own previously-developed three-part test101 to apply the 
exception, finding that the Hosanna-Tabor opinion contained no “rigid 
formula” for application.102 The Fifth Circuit’s holding demonstrates that 
Hosanna-Tabor was only a small step in clarifying the ministerial 
exception, and that it will largely be left to lower courts to utilize or 
develop their own guidelines for application.   
While the majority opinion in Hosanna-Tabor carefully left room for 
continued development of the ministerial exception, it was plain in its 
understanding that the ministerial exception fully precludes Title VII and 
similar employee protections, such as the ADA and ADEA.103 This was a 
point heavily contested by the EEOC in their arguments before the 
Supreme Court, as they argued that the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision104 
 
religious bodies. 
Id.  
100. Id. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
101. The Fifth Circuit described its previously established ministerial exception test as follows: 
First this court must consider whether employment decisions regarding the position at issue 
are made largely on religious criteria . . . Second, to constitute a minister for purposes of the 
“ministerial exception,” the court must consider whether the plaintiff was qualified and 
authorized to perform the ceremonies of the Church . . . Third, and probably most important, 
is whether [the employee] engaged in activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical or 
religious, including whether the plaintiff attends to the religious needs of the faithful.  
Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 175-76 (5th Cir. 2012). (citing 
Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
102. “The Supreme Court specifically declined to adopt a ‘rigid formula’ for determining when an 
employee is a minister within the meaning of the ministerial exception, concluding instead ‘that the 
exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.’” Id. at 174 (citing Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190).  
103. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188.  
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2012) (ADA anti-retaliation provision). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a) (2012) (Title VII anti-retaliation provision); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012) (ADEA anti-retaliation 
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should apply to religious employers.105 The EEOC supported its assertion 
by looking to the Supreme Court’s 1990 case Employment Division v. 
Smith,106 where the court found that “the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment does not provide a defense to those who violate neutral and 
generally applicable laws, even when their actions are based on religious 
belief.”107 As the ADA is a “neutral and generally applicable” law, the 
EEOC argued that it should not be displaced on First Amendment 
grounds.108 Despite these arguments by the EEOC, the Court held that 
employee protections such as the ADA and Title VII are precluded by the 
ministerial exception.109 
Title VII and other statutes such as the ADA and ADEA speak to the 
vulnerability of the employee in the employer-employee relationship. Title 
VII makes discrimination on the basis of certain characteristics unlawful 
in the workplace,110 the ADA makes discrimination on the basis of 
disability unlawful in the workplace,111 and the ADEA makes 
discrimination on the basis of age unlawful in the workplace.112 Therefore, 
the Supreme Court granting the ministerial exception the capacity to 
displace these workplace protections is significant.  
Carrying such a weight, I argue that the ministerial exception’s 
application calls for an additional step on the part of the employer.  
 
 
provision).  
105. “The only question presented in this case is…whether the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision is 
unconstitutional as applied to a religious employer that fires an employee…for asserting her rights 
under the ADA. The answer to that question is no.” Brief for the Federal Respondent, 10-11, Hosanna-
Tabor v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (No. 10-553) 2011 WL 3319555. 
106. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
107. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 11, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (No. 10-553) (citing 
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990)).  
108. Id. 
109. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188.  
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. See, e.g. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) 
(“The language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment 
opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially 
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens”).  
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). See also Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 471 (1999) 
(the ADA “prohibits covered employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of their 
disabilities”).  
112. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012). See also Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 
(2009) (the ADEA “makes it unlawful for an employer to take adverse action against an employee 
‘because of such individual’s age.’”). 
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III.  PROPOSAL 
 
As detailed above, the ministerial exception removes employee 
protections such as Title VII from the employer-employee relationship 
when the employer is a religious institution and the employee is a minister. 
The preclusion of Title VII and other employee protections was 
established in McClure v. Salvation Army113 and was upheld in Hosanna-
Tabor.114 With such precedent, I argue that the religious organization 
employers should be required by courts to show that the employee they 
contend to be a minister was on notice prior to the dispute at hand that the 
position the employee holds or held was one of a minister, and therefore 
within the realm of the ministerial exception. This effectively raises the 
burden for employers, it compensates for the lack of protection such 
employees may well face should a dispute arise, and provides several 
other benefits, such as increased communication between employer and 
employee, that may reduce the need for court intervention.  
I propose a discrete three-prong conjunctive test for applying the 
ministerial exception.115 The first two prongs are already included in case 
law, though not identified by all courts as prongs of a specific test. The 
first is that the employer be a religious organization.116 The second is that 
the position of the employee in question be that of a minister.117 The third, 
which I propose, is a notice requirement: employers should be required to 
 
113. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).  
We find that the application of the provisions of Title VII to the employment relationship 
existing between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a church and its minister would 
result in an encroachment by the State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden 
to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.  
Id. at 560-61.  
114. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188 (the ministerial exception “precludes application of [Title VII] 
to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers”). 
115. Effectively, this allows the ministerial exception to function as an affirmative defense to an 
employee’s claim of discrimination. For an alternative approach, see Leslie Griffin’s article, The Sins 
of Hosanna-Tabor, in which she argues that the employee should then have an opportunity to rebut the 
affirmative defense, similar to the traditional burden-shifting framework of an employment 
discrimination claim. See Griffin, supra note 90. 
116. As held in Hosanna-Tabor, the ministerial exception is particular to employment at a “religious 
institution.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. 
117. Similarly, Hosanna-Tabor defines the scope of the ministerial exception as between a “religious 
institution and its ministers.” Id.  
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show that the employee was on notice that the employee’s position was 
considered by the employer to be subject to the ministerial exception prior 
to the circumstances that gave rise to the employer’s claim. Each of these 
prongs is addressed more fully below.  
The requirement that the employer be a religious organization is 
implicated in Hosanna-Tabor, though not fully analyzed. For example, the 
majority opinion refers to the defendant employer as “the Church” 
throughout the opinion. However, Justice Roberts refrains from any direct 
analysis as to whether the employer qualifies as a religious institution. 
This prong of the test is further discussed in The Elephant in Hosanna-
Tabor, where Murray argues that this is a key piece of analysis for the 
ministerial exception. 118 
The requirement that the position of the employee be a minister is the 
focus of Hosanna-Tabor, and the opinion provides guidance on the issue. 
In evaluating whether the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor was a minister, the 
court found the following facts persuasive: “Hosanna-Tabor held Perich 
out as a minister, with a role distinct from that of most of its members”119; 
“Perich’s title as a minister reflected a significant degree of training 
followed by a formal process of commissioning”120; “Perich held herself 
out as a minister of the Church by accepting the formal call to religious 
service”121; “Perich’s job duties reflected a role in conveying the Church’s 
message and carrying out its mission.”122 While these are not set forth as 
factors to be identified in each case in which a ministerial exception is 
sought, these serve as a guide for courts going forward.  
Finally, I propose a requirement that an employer provide notice to the 
employee that the employer considers the employee’s position to be that of 
a minister and therefore beyond the reach of employee protections against 
discrimination. Such notice would formally acknowledge that the 
employee understood his or her employment protections were limited and 
that he or she agreed to an employment arrangement without such 
protections. Providing notice would protect employees from being without 
 
118. See Murray, supra note 92. 
119. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191.   
120. Id.  
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 192. 
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certain protections they may otherwise reasonably believe they hold. This 
process encourages a dialogue between an employer and employee prior to 
any dispute arising. Ideally, this would limit the disputes that reach the 
court, allowing the court to avoid acting in internal church matters—a role 
it specifically dreaded assuming in Watson.123  
Beyond saving litigation costs for both sides, notice would benefit 
employees by serving as a potential bargaining point in hiring negotiations 
(they may point out, for example, that a position without employee 
protections calls for a slight increase in benefits), and encourages them to 
enter an employment arrangement with a more stringent eye towards 
employer practices that may be problematic. Absent a notice requirement, 
employees will likely enter into the employment relationship based on 
asymmetric information. For employers, notice would be a significant 
protection against claims by minister employees. Ultimately, notice would 
encourage both sides to approach their employment agreements more 
realistically.  
Overall, these requirements help courts by largely transitioning the 
minister determination from one that is entirely substantive to one that is 
largely procedural, but with the flexibility for a substantive review. As the 
Court noted in Watson, it hesitates to involve itself in internal church 
matters.124 Therefore, a procedural evaluation allows the court to preside 
over disputes between a religious institution and its employees without 
appearing to evaluate a particular religious practice or belief.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Following Hosanna-Tabor, the ministerial exception is firmly rooted in 
the employment landscape of religious organizations. The Court has 
 
123. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 735 (1872). 
[W]e have held [this case] under advisement for a year, not uninfluenced by the hope, that 
since the civil commotion . . . has passed away, that charity, which is so large an element in 
the faith of both parties, and which, by one of the apostles of that religion, is said to be the 
greatest of all the Christian virtues, would have brought about a reconciliation. But we have 
been disappointed. 
Id.  
124. Id. 
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unanimously held that the First Amendment precludes Title VII and other 
employee-oriented protections from applying to ministerial positions of a 
religious employer. This rule had been utilized in every circuit prior to the 
2012 ruling in Hosanna-Tabor, and has now been blessed by the Supreme 
Court.  
While Hosanna-Tabor was important in affirming that such an 
exception exists, the Court neglected to provide guidance on key aspects 
of the exception’s application. This analytical gap is particularly 
problematic when it entails leaving certain employees without any 
protection or remedy against discrimination or harassment in the 
workplace.  
To help protect workers while upholding the Hosanna-Tabor conclusion 
that the First Amendment trumps Title VII, I propose that the courts look 
to the employer to meet a three-prong test prior to applying a ministerial 
exception. Two of these prongs are already present in the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Hosanna-Tabor, though are not clarified as part of a clear-cut 
test: (1) that the position in question be a minister; (2) that the employer be 
a religious institution. The third is one that has not been employed, but I 
argue that it is necessary in order to preserve the integrity of federal 
employment discrimination laws, is a notice requirement.  
A clarified threshold rule such as this three-prong test will help ensure 
that religious institutions and their ministers approach employment 
conflicts on even ground. Faced with the ministerial exception, employees 
in these circumstances are without resort to employment discrimination 
claims, no matter how blatantly a religious employer’s conduct may 
violate such laws as Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA. The only way to 
approach such an imbalance of power is to set a clear, high standard that a 
religious employer must meet in order to invoke the ministerial exception.  
Furthermore, a notice requirement such as the one I propose serves 
several benefits. It will encourage communication between the religious 
employer and minister prior to any conflict arising, thereby potentially 
obviating, or at least limiting, the need for court involvement in several 
cases. Further, it will help the minister employee more effectively navigate 
the workplace, understanding from the time of hire that they are 
significantly less than a non-ministerial employee would hold in the 
workplace.  
 Following Hosanna-Tabor, the ministerial exception has a clear place 
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in employment law for religious employers. To ensure that it is applied 
fairly and justly, courts must hold religious employers to a clear, high 
standard before it can be invoked. Only then will the Courts uphold the 
country’s values of both religious liberty and equality.   
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